

**Top Secret**

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1.	OLC Subject		
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.			
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**Warning Notice**

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

**Top Secret**

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ROUTING

**Secret**

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1	OLC Subject		
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GAO

27 April 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Acting Legislative Counsel

SUBJECT: GAO/Intelligence Community Relationships

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Acting DCI, from Acting  
Legislative Counsel, Subject: Relations  
with the General Accounting Office and  
Response to their Draft Report, "Defense  
Reconnaissance Intelligence Assets" -  
dated 24 March 19

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1. (U) Action Requested: None; this memorandum is for your information in preparation for your lunch with Comptroller General Staats on 28 April 1978.


2. (U) Background: Referent memorandum recommended positions on pending GAO requests for:

a. Substantive comments on the GAO study, "Defense Reconnaissance Intelligence Assets;" and

b. Compartmented security clearances for GAO staffers in connection with four intelligence related studies being initiated by GAO.

3. (U) This memorandum addresses concerns raised by you on 2b above in the context of the larger problem of CIA/Intelligence Community relationships with GAO. Options for handling the security clearance problem are presented in Tab B.

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and where GAO must understand that role in order to assess the overall performance of the Executive Branch in areas which are subject to GAO review. With respect to program management audits of Intelligence Community and intelligence related activities, the problems mostly stem from the need to protect compartmented and sources and methods information which is also generally true of requests in the area of compliance with requirements of general law.

7. (U) There are a number of general concerns with respect to our cooperation with GAO requests:

a. A number of their requests for substantive intelligence briefings call for considerable manpower on the part of the Agency.

b. Many times, GAO investigators want to go outside the Intelligence Community to talk about intelligence matters.

c. There is no Intelligence Community security control over GAO reports.

d. GAO, from time to time, does evaluation studies in areas where they have no real expertise.

e. We are often asked to comment on GAO reports but in doing so we face the dilemma of either making no comment and allowing inaccuracies to go forward or commenting which generally requires that we go into sensitive areas.

8. (U) The latest request received from GAO is in the compliance with general law area and came through State. GAO is studying Executive Branch compliance with the Case Act (reporting of international agreements to Congress) apparently as a follow-up to a request of Senator James Abourezk (D., S. Dak.), Chairman, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, and State has asked us how the agreements we have reported to Congress should be listed. As you know, these agreements involve some of our most sensitive operations and relations with foreign intelligence services.

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a. Discussions with Mr. Staats, if possible, be limited to the narrow subject of GAO's request for clearances for people to do the studies of the reconnaissance and other type programs as set out at Tab E; and

b. If pushed to the wall, agree to review our policy regarding clearances for GAO if a particular congressional committee with appropriate intelligence jurisdiction has specifically requested the study, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence or the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as appropriate has concurred in the request, there are specific safeguards to assure against proliferation, and Mr. Staats himself has personally approved the request (Option 3 of Tab B).

In reconsidering our policy, the following guidelines may be appropriate:

a. GAO establish a small team (four to six people) to do all approved studies.

b. Minimum rotation of team members.

c. Clearances granted only as needed and suspended upon completion of study.

d. All studies conducted in premises under the control of the activity being studied.

e. All material related to the study stored in facilities controlled by the activity.

f. Certain extremely sensitive data would be refused totally including identities of agents and liaison services cooperating.



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